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Abstract  
 
Motivation 
Maintenance policy assessments usually rely on 
expert judgement. We seek for some history 
based validation. Organisations may use our 
inference to assess risks of maintenance policy 
violations. 
 
Approach 
We depart from the arbitrary viewpoint that 
decisions have observable effects. We confine to 
a dependency between a maintenance policy and 
functionality. We implement (Granger, 1980)’s 
notion of prima facie causality that suits history 
based inferences under an observational study. A 
case study which is realistic in terms of sample 
size and operationalization allows us to reflect on 
inference precision. 
 
Achievements 
We implemented an argument to infer a prima 
facie cause between a maintenance policy and 
functionality. We showed some delimitations of 
the applicability to any kind of maintenance policy 
violation and to the recordings from any 
organisation. 
 
Recommendations 
-  Reduce controversy about maintenance policy 
   assessments. 
-  Improve integrity of maintenance recordings. 
-  Ensure that the sampling rate of performance  
   indicators enables reconstruction of the signal. 
1. Introduction 
Although many have an intuitive notion that 
maintenance policies should be obeyed, 
remarkably little effort has been spent on 
systematically analysing the effects of 
maintenance policy violations. This paper 
attempts to infer effects of a maintenance policy 
from evidence of an organization’s normal course 
of operations. Organizations may exploit this 
inference assess risks of maintenance policy 
violations.  
 
Maintenance policy assessments like the RCM 
process often rely on expert judgement. We do 
not aim for some enhanced RCM process that 
elicits some optimal maintenance policy. This 
paper naively seeks for observable effects of 
maintenance policy violations. Naïve because 
rational decisions may not be entirely free from an 
individual’s mind state. On the other hand, to 
retain maintenance policy assessments as a 
scientific discipline, correspondence with some 
common sense reality seems essential. To reveal 
the causal effects of a maintenance policy, this 
paper implements an approach to causal 
inference in a maintenance decision making 
context.  
2. Origins of maintenance 
Maintenance is not a faith beyond control of 
mankind. Maintenance roots from conscious 
decisions to pursue a better future. Figure 1 
shows that a decision “to maintain or not to 
maintain” provides access to a set of futures, 
given maintenance or to the complementary set of 
counterfactual futures without maintenance. 
Decisions typically matter for a decision maker. 
This paper is irrelevant for decision makers who 
are indifferent towards these futures. 
 
Any decision to maintain roots from some 
preference for a future with maintenance. 
Decision theory conventionally quantifies 
preference by utility. Utility may be seen as an 
entirely subjective property of an individual’s mind 
state, but utility may also be seen as some 
function built on potentially observable variables. 
In the latter case, decisions could become 
justifiable by observations. We refer to  
(Bermudez, 2009), (Epstein, 2011) for a more in 
depth introduction to this philosophical aspect of 
decision theory. This paper just adopts a possibly 
controversial viewpoint that there is accounting for 
tastes; i.e. preference is explainable by 
observable variables. This viewpoint is a 
precondition to justify a maintenance policy by 
observable effects. 
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In the practice of management decision making, a 
belief that decisions have observable effects 
seems widespread (Drucker, 1954), (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996). We therefore just adopt the idea 
that an organization’s utility follows from 
performance indicators. 
To maintain 
or 
NOT to maintain
A set of futures, 
given maintenance
A set of futures, 
given no maintenance
Utility
Utility
 
Figure 1 Representation of a decision to maintain 
 
Maintenance scorecards conventionally entail 
leading and lagging performance indicators. 
Leading indicators are generally seen as causal 
for lagging indicators. Figure 2 shows that 
maintenance decisions (D) cause an item’s 
functionality (Q) and resource costs (C). Then, a 
maintenance policy (being a set of decisions) 
aims to maximize a utility function UD(C,Q). 
 
Lagging maintenance 
performance indicator 
(result indicator): 
“functionality” (Q) 
“resource costs”(C) 
Leading maintenance 
performance indicator 
(enabling indicator): 
“maintenance policy” (D) 
 
Figure 2 Simplified maintenance scorecard 
 
The causal relation between resource costs (C) 
and maintenance policy (D) is often 
straightforward. This paper confines to a causal 
relation between a maintenance policy (D) and 
functionality (Q): DÆQ. If DÆQ appears 
nonexistent, functionality (Q) remains unaffected 
by a maintenance policy (D). Then, hoping is as 
effective as a maintenance policy to achieve 
functionality. We just attempt to observe DÆQ to 
justify the presence of functionality (Q) in the utility 
function of a maintenance policy (D). 
3. Causal inference 
Causality does not follow from a statistical 
association. Causality requires access to a 
counterfactual reality that would have occurred if 
we had decided otherwise.  
 
Thoughts about causal formalisms date back to  
(Wright, 1921)‘s Structural Equations Modelling,  
(Neyman, 1923) and  (Rubin, 1974)’s potential 
outcomes framework and  (Suppes, 1970)’s 
probability raising approach. An in depth 
discussion of these formalisms is beyond the 
scope of this paper. We originally departed from  
(Pearl, 2000)’s Structural Causal Modelling that 
unifies previously mentioned formalisms  (Pearl, 
2010) but we finally resort to a modest claim of 
prima facie causality in the sense of  (Granger, 
1980). This because we infer from recordings 
about the item’s normal course of operations; i.e. 
we confine to a history based inference under an 
observational study. So, we reason from 
recordings as they occurred without being able to 
intervene. Causal inference in an observational 
research is problematic (Greenland, 2011) since 
we do not know the counterfactual reality. 
However, we may exploit maintenance policy 
violations to access the counterfactual reality. 
 
(Granger, 1980)’s operationalised causality for 
evidence from an observational research. 
(Granger, 1980)’s notion of causality relies on the 
following principles: 
1  An effect does not precede its cause in time; 
2  The direction of a cause is time invariant; 
3  A cause entails unique information about the 
   effect that is not available otherwise.  
CAUSE
“Maintenance Policy”
(DT)
EFFECT
“Functionality”
(QT+x)
Information set={dT,qT+x}
 
Figure 3 Path graph of a spurious cause 
 
The first principle forbids a future causing the 
past; i.e. an association between QT+X and DT is 
not explainable by QT+XÆDT. The second principle 
imposes that DTÆQT implies DT+XÆQT+X  but the 
positive strength of this causal relationship may 
change. The third principle has been addressed 
by confining to only a modest claim of prima facie 
(~at first sight) causality that only holds with 
respect to Figure 3‘s information set {d,q}. 
Causality would require an information set that 
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entails all knowledge in the universe up to a time 
T. 
 
If we only know {d,q}, Figure 3 may infer a prima 
facie cause between D and Q that is in fact 
spurious. Because an information set is finite and 
countable in practice, we cannot prevent that 
prima facie causes may appear non-existent 
causes like the one in Figure 3. Even upon the 
truth of Figure 3, it is still meaningful to test for 
prima facie causality to check for resilience 
against maintenance policy violations in general. 
Equation 1 specifies the criterion to identify DT as 
a prima facie cause for QT+X with respect to Figure 
3’s information set. 
 ܲݎ(்ܳା௫ = ݍ்ା௫|ܦ் = ்݀) ് ܲݎ(்ܳା௫ = ݍ்ା௫)      (1) 
 
4. Case study 
Without interpretation, an argument reduces to a 
mathematical formalism that cannot claim 
anything about reality. So, the argument requires 
an interpretation to be practically meaningful. 
 
Both the maintenance policy (D) and functionality 
(Q) are maintenance performance indicators on 
Figure 2‘s maintenance scorecard. Organisations 
use performance indicators to assess fulfilment of 
requirements. Requirements are essentially 
subjective and people may disagree about them. 
Then, inference precision suffers from ambiguity 
about requirements. 
 
An inference from highly controversial evidence 
cannot claim much about a common sense reality. 
We therefore used a case study that was quite 
advanced in terms of operationalization and 
sample size to increase inference precision. Even 
the candidate case studies of larger sample sizes 
did not invite for high dimensional models. We 
therefore depart from a univariate representation 
for maintenance policy (D) and functionality (Q) 
and Figure 4‘s memoryless causal structure. 
 
This case study operationalised maintenance 
policy violations (D) by a queue of delays. Every 
decision to maintain is time bound. An allowance 
to defer maintenance till infinity does not need any 
sacrifice of resources. A delay may therefore 
apply to every decision. An alignment error for 
example, is a violation that only applies on a very 
specific subset of a maintenance policy. The 
evidence for delays seems to be efficiently 
collected since most of the candidate case studies 
already record required and actual completion 
dates of maintenance decisions. Finally, delays 
appeared abundant in the candidate case studies. 
The counterfactual reality (to be avoided by the 
maintenance policy) seems therefore attainable. 
In conclusion, if we aim to measure a generic 
response to maintenance policy violations, a 
queue of delays seems an attractive 
operationalization. 
CAUSE
“Maintenance Policy”
(DT)
EFFECT
“Functionality”
(QT+x)
Information set={qT+x,dT,qT}
CAUSE
“Functionality”
(QT)
B
qTdT
 
Figure 4 Path graph of the case study 
 
This case study operationalised functionality (Q) 
by output. The existence of this case study roots 
from its capability to produce output. The 
operational intend is to constantly maximise 
output which makes required output a superfluous 
element of the model. 
 
A part of the maintenance work load, may not be 
related to output. An expert removed all 
maintenance decisions that are deferrable till 
infinity without affecting output. Eventually, we 
could extend our analysis to various compositions 
of the queue. 
 
We now compare a cardinal (continuous) and a 
dichotomous (discrete) operationalization of 
maintenance policy and functionality.  
 
4.1 Cardinal operationalization 
Figure 5 shows the evidence, consisting of a time 
series of daily queue and output (d,q)[1,1978]. 
 
 
Figure 5 Evidence (d,q)[1,1978]. 
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We confirmed that the sampling rate of Figure 5’s 
signals suffices for the frequencies in both signals. 
Output (Q) seems a strongly auto-correlated 
signal that is either high or low. A dichotomous 
representation of output (Q) does not appear 
problematic. In general, the queue of delays (D) is 
poorly refreshed between T and T+1. Due to 
some excessive peeks, the queue of delays (D) 
appears not exactly a random walk with a barrier. 
These peeks should not be ignored as outliers 
because they are highly informative for the 
existence of DÆQ. 
 
Equation 2 defines the criterion to identify a 
maintenance policy DT as a prima facie cause of 
QT+x with respect to Figure 4’s information set. 
 ܲݎ(்ܳା௫ = ݍ்ା௫|்ܳ = ݍ் ,ܦ் = ்݀) ് ܲݎ(்ܳା௫ = ݍ்ା௫|்ܳ = ݍ்) 
(2) 
 
We infer Equation 2’s probabilities from Figure 6’s 
argument. Figure 6’s propositions P1,P2 are 
observed evidence, all other propositions are 
presumed. P3’s presumption is not problematic. 
Evidence of (d,q)[1,t] does not suffice for P4’s 
independence and we typically lack deep 
knowledge about M1’s “law” that explains the 
relation between a maintenance policy (D) and 
functionality (Q). Figure 6’s argument confirms 
that a probability is not a deductive consequence 
of a finite time series. An inference of a probability 
from a finite time series is imprecise. 
 
P1 ܦ் = ்݀,்ܳ = ݍ் 
 ;Observe a value dT. 
 
M1 (ܦ் = ்݀,்ܳ = ݍ்) ՜ ൫ ෠்ܳା௫ = ݍො்ା௫൯ 
 ;Presume a model M1 that estimates QT+X from P1 
 
C1 ׵ ෠்ܳା௫ = ݍො்ା௫ 
 ;Follows from P1,M1 
 
P2 ்ܳା௫ = ݍ்ା௫ 
 ;Observe a value qT+X. 
 
P3 (்ܳା௫ = ݍ்ା௫) ե (ܦ் = ்݀ ,்ܳ = ݍ்) 
 ;Presume (Granger, 1980)’s first principle. 
(Granger, 1980)’s second principle just presumes 
that P3,P4 hold for all T. 
 
P4 (ܦ் = ்݀,்ܳ = ݍ்) ո ൫ ෠்ܳା௫ െ்ܳା௫ = ݍො்ା௫ െ ݍ்ା௫൯ 
 ;Presume (Granger, 1980)’s third principle 
 
P5 (ܲ1,ܯ1,ܲ2,ܲ3,ܲ4) ՞ ܲݎ(்ܳା௫ = ݍ்ା௫) 
 ;Presume this definition of Equation 1’s probabilities 
 
Figure 6 Argument to infer Equation 2’s 
probabilities 
 
Still, we naively sought in the family of linear time 
invariant models for an acceptable presumption 
for Figure 6’s model M1. Neither in the time 
domain, nor in the frequency domain we found a 
parsimonious model that did not trouble P4’s 
presumption of independent prediction errors in 
Figure 6. 
 
For this case study, not every delay in the queue 
(D) equally attributes to output (Q) and not every 
drop in output (Q) seems explainable by a peek in 
the queue of delays. We lack knowledge about 
other causes of output (Q) and about the model 
M1. We therefore suggest that we have not been 
successful to infer a claim regarding prima facie 
causality at sufficient precision. 
 
4.2 Dichotomous operationalization 
This approach just explores whether peeks in a 
queue are predictive for an upstate. We therefore 
build a dichotomous time series (s,y)[1,1977] on 
(d,q)[1,1978] by Equation 3. 
 ்ܻ = ൜0, ݂݅ ்ܳ > 18 (ݑ݌ݏݐܽݐ݁)       
1, ݂݅ ்ܳ ൑ 18 (݂ܽݑ݈ݐ ݏݐܽݐ݁)  
(3) ்ܵ = ൜0, ݂݅ ܦ்ାଵ െ ܦ் ൑ 41, ݂݅ ܦ்ାଵ െ ܦ் > 4 
 
Then, Figure 5 transforms to Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7 Evidence (s,y)[1,1977]. 
 
Dichotomous variables are less precise than 
cardinal variables but they allow for a precise 
argument. Figure 8’s argument only presumes 
proposition P6’s claim that ST is not a prima facie 
cause. Figure 8’s conclusion C1 is a deductive 
consequence of the evidence P1 and a claim of 
non prima facie causality P6. As opposed to 
Figure 6’s argument, Figure 8’s argument omits 
the need for an arbitrary model to infer the 
probabilities of Figure 8’s P6.  
 
Figure 8 infers the likelihood of a presumed non 
prima facie causality. We suggest that a 
dichotomous operationalization more precisely 
infers claims regarding prima facie causality, 
given a case study and Figure 4’s independence 
assumptions. 
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P1 (ܵ,ܻ)[ଵ,௧] = (ݏ, ݕ)[ଵ,௧] 
 ;Observe a time series of S,Y. 
 
P2 
( ଴ܰ = ݊଴) ؠ ቌ෍ܫ௧ି௫்ୀଵ (்ܵ = 0, ்ܻ = ݕ்)ቍ 
 ; Follows from P1. I(.) is an indicator function that 
takes a value 1 if the condition in the braces is true 
and zero otherwise. 
 
P3 
( ଵܰ = ݊ଵ) ؠ ቌ෍ܫ௧ି௫்ୀଵ (்ܵ = 1, ்ܻ = ݕ்)ቍ 
 ; Follows from P1. 
 
P4 
(ܭ଴ = ݇଴) ؠ ቌ෍ܫ௧ି௫்ୀଵ (்ܻ ା௫ = 0, ்ܵ = 0, ்ܻ = ݕ்)ቍ 
 ; Follows from P1. 
 
P5 
(ܭଵ = ݇ଵ) ؠ ቌ෍ܫ௧ି௫்ୀଵ (்ܻ ା௫ = 0, ்ܵ = 1, ்ܻ = ݕ்)ቍ 
 ; Follows from P1. 
 
P6 ൫ܲݎ(்ܻ ା௫ = 0|்ܵ = ݏ் , ்ܻ = ݕ்)൯ؠ ൫ܲݎ(்ܻ ା௫ = 0|்ܻ = ݕ்)൯ 
 ;Presume that ST is not a prima facie cause  
 
M1 
(ܲ6) ՜ ൮ܲݎ(݇଴,݇ଵ|݊଴,݊ଵ,݇଴ + ݇ଵ) = ቀ݊଴݇଴ቁ× ቀ݊ଵ݇ଵቁ൬݊଴ + ݊ଵ݇଴ + ݇ଵ൰ ൲ 
 ; Follows from P6. M1’s implicant is a two sample 
permutation test;  
 
C1 ׵ ൮ܲݎ(݇଴,݇ଵ|݊଴,݊ଵ,݇଴ + ݇ଵ) = ቀ݊଴݇଴ቁ× ቀ݊ଵ݇ଵቁ൬݊଴ + ݊ଵ݇଴ + ݇ଵ൰ ൲ 
 ;Follows from  P1,P6. Given some evidence P1, C1’s 
probability entirely relies on the presumption of P6’s 
prima facie cause. 
 
Figure 8 Argument of a two sample permutation 
test 
5. Discussion 
This section provides the results and comments 
on the findings of the case study.  
 
 
Figure 9 Reliability plot given ST=sT,YT=0 
 
Figure 9 shows two curves that represent the 
reliability during x days, given that the item was up 
at t=0 (YT=0) and the queue increased by less 
(ST=0) respectively more than four (ST=1). These 
curves are MLE estimates. The p-values are 
indicative for retaining Figure 8’s presumption P6 
of non prima facie causality. The p-values just 
follow from a trivial extension of Figure 8’s 
argument. Figure 9 suggests that the existence of 
a peek in the queue of delays prima facie causes 
a drop in reliability after 10 days.  
 
Figure 10 shows time-to-restoration curves for two 
different values of ST, given that the item is down 
at t=0 (YT=1). Figure 10 suggests that a peek in 
the queue of delays during downtime prima facie 
causes the time-to-restoration during the next five 
days. 
 
Figure 10 Distribution of Time To Restoration 
given ST=sT,YT=1 
 
Figure 9’s and Figure 10’s prima facie causalities 
may appear spurious but they certainly invite for 
an explanation to mitigate risks.  
 
This case study entailed about 5,5 years of 
evidence. A split sample test to check for similar 
results from just 3 years of recording appeared 
unsuccessful. Extending, Figure 4’s path graph 
with candidate causes DT-1,QT-1 left some 
frequencies unobserved. These symptoms 
therefore do not encourage vector representations 
for maintenance policy (D) and functionality (Q). 
 
This research explored more case studies than 
the one we detailed in this paper. It appeared that 
none of the case studies already applied time 
series analysis on their maintenance performance 
indicators. Some of the case studies recorded 
scorecards at a weekly or monthly sampling rate. 
This sampling rate is often only determined by the 
frequency of meetings on maintenance 
performance. None of the case studies justified 
the sampling rate of their maintenance recordings 
by a need to reconstruct the original signal. This is 
quite essential for time series analysis. In a way, it 
was a matter of luck to find a case study whose 
sampling rate allowed to approximate the original 
signals. Moreover, a high sampling rate 
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contributes to efficiently collecting enough 
evidence. 
 
Some organisations raised severe doubts about 
their maintenance recordings. Common sense 
about the required completion date of 
maintenance lacks. Many organisations quantified 
a required completion date by a categorical 
variable. So, maintenance should for example be 
completed within either 1,7 or 30 days. Some 
experts claimed that these categories are too 
imprecise to represent “genuine delays”. 
 
Finally, some experts strongly distrusted their 
maintenance recordings. Human factors, software 
conversions or reorganisations often seem to bias 
maintenance recordings. An assumption of self-
evidence then appeared problematic. 
6. Conclusions 
We implemented an argument that infers a prima 
facie cause between a maintenance policy and 
functionality. We applied this history based 
inference to evidence from an observational 
study. In general, the inference precision appears 
to be affected by the selected operationalization of 
the variables and by the integrity and sampling 
rate of maintenance recordings. 
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